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RULES OF DECISION IN NONDIVERSITY SUITS
DESPITE Erie R.R. v. Tompkins" famous statement that "there is no federal
general common law,"'I judge-made law ungoverned by constitutional or statu-
tory provisions-common law-has emanated from the courts of the United
States since their inception. 2 The very day the Supreme Court decided ,ric
it resolved another case by resort to rules of "federal common law."a Such
rules are still frequently applied outside of the single area of diversity juris-
diction in which Erie bound federal judges to follow state comnmon law.4
Under other heads of civil jurisdiction,6 however, the line of demarcation
between state and federal common law remains unclear. Criteria for selecting
one or the other as a rule of decision 0 are inadequately defined. Federal
1. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
2. The term "common law" as used throughout this Comment refers to the unwritten
decisional lav formulated by the courts and based upon their decisions, not the general
body of legal principles known as "the Common Law" which distinguishes our legal system
from the civil law nations. See 1 BEALE, CoDFmcr or LAWS 26-28 (1935).
It was recognized that federal courts, in construing the federal constitution and statutes,
were evolving a true federal common law dependent upon national authority, as opposed
to federal interpretation of the common law of the states. Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. ,4t5,
478-79 (1888); see 1 MoopE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE ff 0.318[1] (1959).
3. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creel Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
4. See Note, Exceptions to Erie v. Tompkints: The Survival of Federal Conmnon Law,
59 HARv. L. REv. 966 (1946) ; Comment, 40 CoRNELL LQ. 561, 563-65 (1955) ; Note, 34
ComaExu L.Q. 110 (1948).
5. The judicial power of the United States, derived from the U.S. Co,-;sT. art. 111, § 2,
embraces two general categories of litigation. Jurisdiction is sometimes based on the
nature of the subject matter-suits arising under the federal constitution, laws, and
treaties, and cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Jurisdiction also rests on the
nature of the litigants-cases affecting ambassadors, consuls and public ministers, con-
troversies to which the United States is a party, controversies between two or more
states, between a state and citizens of another state, between citizens of different states,
and between a state or its citizens and a foreign state or its citizens. A further lad
of jurisdiction, suits between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants
of different states, combines both party and subject matter characteristics. In addition
to the article III courts, there are other federal courts whose authority derives from
the legislative power granted Congress under articles I and IV. These tribunals now
include the territorial courts, see 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcricE ff 0.3[3.-1] (1959), and
probably the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the Customs Courts and the Court
of Claims, id. at 1 0.4[3]. Article I also authorizes federal jurisdiction exercised by
military courts, although these are held technically to be outside the regular judicial
system. Id. at 1 0.5[1] ; Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857). But even
in the nonarticle III courts, established to adjudicate matters primarily federal in
character, the question of applicability of state law arises. "See, e.g., United States v.
Woolridge, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 510, 514 n.4 (1959); Rhode Island Discount Co. v. United
States, 118 Ct. Cl. 262, 94 F. Supp. 669 (1951).
6. By "rules of decision" are meant the laws which are applied by courts to determine
the questions brought before them. This Comment is concerned only with suits brought
in federal courts, although the state courts have a significant role in enforcing federally-
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courts often apply state law without indicating whether their selection is
mandatory or discretionary.7 If discretionary, the reasons for exercising the
option are not satisfactorily explained. On the other hand, when the state
rule is rejected in favor of "federal law," the courts do not always specify
whether they are making common law in the usual sense, or only implenenting
a particular statutory policy. Nor do they detail the method and hierarchy of
authority through which federal common law is derived. 8
This Comment will focus primarily upon the two areas of federal juri.,-
diction where the problem is currently the most significant, suits to which
the United States is a party and those which involve interpretation of a federal
statute. The expanding role of the United States as a litigator 0 and the
widening range of federal legislation 1 0 make these areas quantitatively of
great importance, while qualitatively they now present greater difficulties than
'fields such as bankruptcy and admiralty, where the problem has alrcady
been extensively discussed." The Comment will first describe the constitu-
tional and statutory bases for the choice of rules of decision in the federal
courts. This will lay the groundwork for a critique of the wide range of un-
fettered judicial choice between federal and state law now prevailing in non-
diversity suits. Finally, the Comment will propose a method of analyzing
the rules-of-decision problem, attempting to identify those considerations which
ought to govern decisions in this area.
HISTORCAL BACKGROUND
The records of the Constitutional Convention do not reveal any discusiun
of the rules of decision to be applied in federal courts.- The reports of the
created rights. See Hart, The Relations Betweet State and Federal Law, 54 C-LlUt.
L. REv. 489, 498 (1954).
7. See, e.g., Schuman Co. v. Nelson, 219 F.2d 627 (3rd Cir. 1955); Gatliff Coal
Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944) ; United States v. Hansett, 120 F2d 121 t2,i
Cir. 1941) ; United States v. Schumacher, 154 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Wis. 1957) ; baukiq,
& Trading Corp. v. RFC, 147 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
8. For an example of the freewheeling use of precedent in the formulation of "tid-
eral law," see CCC v. Rosenberg Bros. & Co., 243 F2d 504 (9th Cr. 1957), citing four
Supreme Court cases, three Sixth Circuit cases, an Eighth Circuit case, a Second Cir-
cuit case, a district case from the District of Maryland, state cases from Ohio, Coanecticut.
and Illinois, Williston on Sales, the Uniform Sales Act, and one Latin maxim.
9. For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1957, 895 civil cases were commenced in thkw
circuit courts, ADmNISTRATrvE OFricE OF THE US. CouRTs AvNN. REP. 160 t1957),
and 19,914 in the district courts, id. at 170. In 1935, about 10,50D such cases were filkd
in the district courts. ADMINISTRATiVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTs A . REv. chart
3 (1942).
10. See Miller, The Constitutional Law of the "Security State," 10 STAN.. L. Rms.
620, 626-28 (1958).
11. See, e.g., GILTmoRE & BLACK, AmnRALTY 374-86 (1957); Hill, The Erie Do, trine
in Bankruptcy, 66 IHAfv. L. REv. 1013, 1016-19 (1953).
12. There was considerable controversy over the existence and jurisdiction of federal
courts. See, e.g., 1 FARRAND, THE RF0RDS OF THE FEDERAL C 'Virzio,. or 1787, 22,
14-29
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ratification debates are but slightly more 'helpful. The only express discussion
of the point seems to be John Marshall's reply to a Virginia delegate who had
asked what law would govern in diversity cases. Taking the example of contract
suits, Marshall stated that the usual conflicts rule, applying the law of the
state in which the contract was made, would be adhered to by the federal courts.13
The implication is that these courts were not to have power to formulate inde-
pendent federal rules of decision in diversity cases.' 4 On the other hand, distinct
and independent federal rules were apparently contemplated for several of the
nondiversity ,heads of jurisdiction. For three of these-admiralty, suits arising
under treaties, and cases affecting ambassadors-the need for a uniform rule
was stressed by ratification speakers. 1, There is also the suggestion that in
suits between a citizen and an alien, federal courts would not be bound by
"partial and wicked" state laws.' 6 The grant of federal jurisdiction over suits
between states, based on the theory that state courts were incompetent to decide
220, 231, 232, 243, 244, 292 (rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as FARRAND] ; 2 id. 45-46, 132,
157, 172; 3 id. 117.
The only proceedings in the Federal Convention bearing even remotely on the rules
of decision problem, 1 id. 2-23, 238; 2 id. 45-46, 132-33, 136, -146-47, evidence a concern
over whether state courts would fairly adjudicate federal matters.
The earlier drafts of article III, less specific than that finally adopted, show an
intention to give the federal courts jurisdiction over cases involving "the national peace
and harmony," admiralty, impeachment of national officers, and collection of national revenue.
See 1 id. 22, 223-24, 231, 238, 244; 2 id. 157, 172-73, 186, 600. But they also contain no
suggestion as to -the applicable rules of decision.
13. 3 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 556-57 (2d ed. 1836) [here-
inafter cited as ELLIOT].
14. In other state ratifying conventions, however, there were comments sounding very
much like -the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). See 2 ELLIOT 491
("I would ask how a merchant must feel to have his property lie at the mercy of te
laws of Rhode Island") (Wilson) ; 3 id. at 535, 549; 3 id. at 565 ("a droll sight, to see
a man on one side of the street punished for a breach of federal law, and on the other
side another man rewarded by the state legislature for -the same act") (Grayson) ; 3 id. at
566 ("Whether ... [the federal courts] will make a law other than the state laws, I
cannot determine") (Grayson). But these statements can be interpreted as meaning
that the federal courts can select the law of the proper state, not that they are free
to form their own body of substantive law.
On the whole, the federal judiciary seems to have -been conceived of as providing
impartial tribunals, against the fear of prejudiced state courts. See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT 533;
3 id. at 535 (local prejudices). See also THE FEDERAIsT No. 80, at 587, 591 (Hamilton
ed. 1871) (Hamilton).
15. These [treaties] may involve us in controversies with foreign nations. It is
necessary, therefore, that they should be determined in the courts of general
government. . . . If, in any case, uniformity be necessary, it must be in the ex-
position of treaties. ... The same principles hold with respect to cases affecting
ambassadors and foreign ministers. To the same principles may also be referred
their cognizance in admiralty and maritime cases.
3 ELLIOT 532 (Madison); accord, 2 ELLIOT 489-90; 3 ELLIOT 570-71. See also TulE
FEDERALIST No. 80, at 587, 588-89, 593 (Hamilton ed. 1871) (Hamilton),
16. 2 ELLIOT 492-93.
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such controversies, seemed to recognize another area in which federal rules of
decision would be applicable."' Similarly, state rules were considered inapposite
in the cases of conflicting land grants, since each court would be bound by it-s
own executive's or legislature's grant.'8 For the two other heads of federal
jurisdiction-cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the
United States and cases in which the United States is a party--even tis scant
guidance is unavailable. 19
Whatever their reticence on the subject at the Convention, many of the
Framers participated in the First -Congress' adoption of the Rules of Decision
Act, section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. This provision, still in effect, stipu-
lated that
the laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties, or
statutes of the United States shall othenvise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the
United States in cases where they apply.20
The act is not, as is sometimes thought, confined to diversity cases; "trials at
common law" 'has long been construed to embrace the other bases of federal
jurisdiction.2' Under some of these nondiversity heads of jurisdiction, how-
ever, the question of state or federal decisional rules has been resolved in favor
of federal judge-made law almost without reference to the Rules of Decision
_Act. Thus, in cases involving ambassadors and consuls, the status of the foreign
representative is a matter of federal law.2 2 Suits under the conflicting land
17. See 2 id. 490-91; 3 id. 530, 571, 591.
1M 2 id. 481; 3 id. 523; see also THE FEDMUAST No. 80, at 587, 589-90, 591, 593
(Hamilton ed. 1871) (Hamilton).
19. Reasons given for federal jurisdiction over suits to which the United States is
a party are discussed at note 110 infra and accompanying text.
20. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92. The section now uses the term
"dvil actions" instead of "trials at common law." 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1958). [The Rules
of Decision Act is hereinafter referred to in the footnotes as Section 34.1
Section 34 was held to be merely declarative of the rule which would have existed
in the absence of statute, and therefore did not by implication exclude the use of state
rules of decision in federal equity suits. Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545, 558-59
(1923) ; see Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 255 U.S. 28 (1921 ) :
Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Trust Co. v. Krumseig, 172 U.S. 351 (1899); Jackson v.
Ludeling, 99 U.S. 513 (1878) (applying civil law); Brine v. Insurance Co., 96 U.S. 627
(1877).
21. See, e.g., Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390
(1906) (Sherman Act treble damage suit) ; Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895)
(patent infringement) ; Andreae v. Redfield, 98 U.S. 225 (1878) (suit to recover customs
duties illegally exacted); United States v. Klein, 153 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1946) (United
States a party) ; Quinette v. Bisso, 136 Fed. 825 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 199 U.S. 60)
(1905) (state law applied in suit in admiralty; Section 34 not mentioned) ; I Moo. Fe 1-
mzAL PancricE fr 0.305[3] (1959).
22. Ambassadors and public ministers are immune to suit, 1 Stat. 117 (1790), 22
U.S.C. § 252 (1958); exclusive jurisdiction of suits against consuls and %ice consuls
is given -to the district courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1351 (1958). Consuls are clothed with diplomatic
immunity for acts in behalf of their government. Jones v. Le Tombe, 3 U.S. (3 Dail. i
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grants head are now rare but the older case law established that federal rules
of decision should be shaped.23 In suits between states, the propriety and neces-
sity of federal decisional -ules 'has consistently been recognized.2 4 The essentially
federal character of admiralty and maritime decisional law has likewise been
clear, although the "saving-to-suitors" clause has given rise to a complex inter-
action of state and federal law.2 5
Under other grants of federal jurisdiction, judicial interpretation of the Rules
of Decision Act has played a more important, and changing role. Although the
act is drafted in terms which indicate a presumption in favor of applying state
rules of decision, three phrases might be construed to restrict the scope of state
law and to present an opportunity for creating a federal common law. The
phrase directing use of state rules of decision only "in cases where they apply,"
seems never to have been expressly relied on for this purpose.20 The Supreme
Court has suggested, however, that this limitation would relieve federal court,,,
from the necessity of following state laws which discriminate against the federld
government,2 7 and, generally, state laws which are inapposite due to the nature of
a suit, e.g., a suit between states.28 The second phase, confining state rules of de-
384 (1798). Status is determined by federal law. See Lyders v. Lund, 32 F.2d 308 (N.D.
Cal. 1929); Landley v. Republic of Panama, 31 F. Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
The acts of consuls as private citizens may be sued upon, and apparently state law
governs. See Carl Byoir & Associates, Inc. v. Tsune-chi Yu, 112 F2d 885 (2d Cir.
1940). But cf. RorrscHAc'ER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 222, at 435 (1939). Federal courts
will take no cognizance of marital relations, leaving this matter to the states. Ohio e.r rel.
Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379 (1930). And the status of a foreign minister passing
through the United States has been determined by state law. Bergman v. De Sicycs, 170
F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948). But see Note, 33 MIxN. L. REv. 540 (1949) (criticizing De
Sieyes.)
Only three cases have been found involving the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.
Jones v. Le Tombe, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 383 (1798) (court dismissed suit against French
consul acting in behalf of his government); Casey v. Galli, 94 U.S. 674 (1876) (vice
consul's liability as stockholder of national banking association decided on merits: no
discussion of jurisdictional question); ex parte Gruber, 269 U.S. 302 (1925) (article
III, § 2 held inapplicable to suits against American consul).
23. See Golson v. Lewis, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 377 (1817) ; Town of Pawlet v. Clark,
13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 291, 324 (1815) ("We will now consider, what is the legal operation
of such a grant, at the common law; and how far it is affected by the laws of New Hamp-
shire or Vermont.").
24. "No man ought certainly to be a judge in his own cause .... This principle has
no inconsiderable weight in designating the federal courts, as the propert tribunals for
the determination of controversies between different states...." THE FuRnAtL~sT- No. 80,
at 591 (Hamilton ed. 1864) (Hamilton); see New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336,
342-43 (1931) ; Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670-71 (1931) ; Arkansas v.
Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158, 175-76 (1918); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95 (1907).
25. GILMORE & BLAcK, ADMIRALTY 33-36, 374-86 (1957).
26. The only extensive discussion that has been found is in Campbell v. Haverhill,
155 U.S. 610, 614-16 (1895).
27. Ibid.; cf. Puhfahl v. Estate of Parks, 299 U.S. 217 (1936) ; Metcalf v. Water-
town, 153 U.S. 671 (1894); Cooke v. Avery, 147 U.S. 375 (1893); Massingill v. Downs,
48 US. (7 How.) 760 (1849).
28. Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 614-16 (1895).
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cisionto controversies in which the federal constitution, treaties, or statutes did
not "otherwise require or provide," was also construed narrowly by the early
federal courts. If the state law in question was not inconsistent with the federal
statute, the silence of Congress was taken to mean that state law was to be
followed. 29 Similarly, the earlier courts seemed less willing than recent courts
to find state law superseded when Congress had legislated in areas within its
exclusive control.3 0 And even when federal law was dearly applicable, state
law was accorded great weight as a matter of comity.3 '
By interpreting the third phrase--"the laws of the several states"-to refer
only -to state statutes and "local" common-law rules, however, the famous de-
cision in Swift v. Tyson 3 2 in 1842 circumscribed the presumption in favor of
state law and furnished federal judges with a significant opportunity to create
common law. Mr. Justice Story reasoned that the act did not "apply . . . to
questions of a... general nature, not at all dependent upon local statutes or
local usages of a fixed and permanent operation."'m The Swift interpretation
of the act remained in force until Erie R.R. v. Tompkins in 1938.34 Erie declared
that "the laws of the several states" embraced both statute and decisional law,-
thus removing Swift's restriction on the act's general applicability, and making
state common law the rule of decision in diversity suits-1 Since Erie, state
common law seems also to afford the rule of decision in suits between states
and citizens of another state,3 7 and in alienage cases.38
29. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, supra note 21, at 397;
Campbell v. Haverhill, supra note 21; Metcalf v. Watertovn, .rnpra note -7; Barney
v. Oelrichs, 138 U.S. 529 (1891) (Section 34 not discussed); Andreae v. Redfield, supra
note 21, at 235.
30. See Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137
(1902); 'Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613 (1898) ; Smith v. Alabama,
124 U.S. 465 (1888); Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99 (1876). Compare Pennsylvania
v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); New York Cent. R.R. v. NVinfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917).
See also Bikl, The Silence of Congress, 41 HARv. L. REv. 200 (1927).
31. See, e.g., Green v. Lessee of Neal, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 291, 293 (1832) ; Jackson ex
dem. St John v. Chew, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 153, 167 (1827) ; Daly's Lessee v. James, 21 U.S.
(8 Wheat) 495, 535 (1823) ; United States v. Wonson, 28 Fed. Cas. 745, 749 (No. 16750)
(C.C.D. 'Mass. 1812).
32. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
33. Id. at 18-19.
34. 304 US. 64 (1938).
35. Id. at 78.
36. Id. at 72-73.
37. Such suits per se do not present a federal question. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v.
Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 560-61, 5S9-90 (1851):
Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U.S. 511, 520 (1893). Of course,
such suits can involve questions of a federal nature. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
324 U.S. 439 (1945).
Federal jurisdiction over such suits is now vested originally, but not exclusively, in
the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (3) (1958). Thus a state may bring suit against
citizens of another state in her own courts. Plaquenines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson,
supra. See generally MooE, THE U.S. JumlcIAL CODE I" 0.03(54), at 627-30 (1949).
38. Diversity and alienage are now treated as one in the Judicial Code. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (1958) ; see MooRE, THE U.S. JuDicIAL CODE 0.03(45), at 309 (1949).
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If applied to other jurisdictional areas, the broader implications of Eric-the
statement that there is no federal general common law-might have further
confined the making of federal law under the "otherwise require or provide"
dause of the Rules of Decision Act. But in a series of cases decided soon after
Erie, the Court began to make clear that Erie was not so to be extended; to the
contrary, the "otherwise require or provide" clause seemed to permit a greater
intrusion of federal decisional rules in cases involving federal statutes or the
United States as a litigant.3 9 Board of County Cornm'rs v. United States,40
decided in 1939, held Erie's choice of law rule inapplicable to a suit brought
by the United States as guardian of an Indian illegally taxed by Missouri.
The government claimed interest on .the refunded tax payments despite a state
law refusing to pay interest. The Court decided that since the tax-exemption
right was derived from a federal treaty, state rules were not binding; it chose to
respect them, however, because of congressional silence and because the Gov-
eminent 'had misled the state tax officers. The following year, in Dietrick v.
Greaney,4' a national bank receiver brought suit on a note executed to circum-
vent a provision of the National Bank Act; the maker defended on the
theory that state common law voided notes given in illegal transactions. The
Court 'held that the policy of the act precluded the defense notwithstanding
Erie. In 1941, in Royal Indem. Co. v. United States,42 the Court reviewed
a ruling that New York law required defendant surety company to pay 6 per
cent interest on the statutory tax obligation owed by its principal to the United
States.43 The Supreme Court, although affirming ,the propriety of the 6 per
cent charge, expressly -held state law not binding in the case of contracts with
the federal government. The following year, D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC 4-1
raised the question of whether the maker of an accommodation note executed
before the passage of the Federal Reserve Act of 1934 could raise the state
common-law defense of no consideration in a suit brought under that act by
the FDIC. The Court held that the policy of the Federal Reserve Act forbade
the assertion of the defense. And in 1943 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States 4,i
applied a federal common-law rule of negotiable instruments, contrary to the
state rule, primarily because the negotiable instrument had been created by
the exercise of the Government's constitutional authority.
THE DECISION TO APPLY FEDERAL LAW
When courts announce that federal law will apply as a rule of decision, the
term "federal law" can have many meanings. 40 The only meaning common
39. See Note, 53 CoLuzi. L. REv. 991, 1007-08 (1953); Note, 59 HAV. L. REv. 966
(1946).
40. 308 U.S. 343 (1939).
41. 309 U.S. 190 (1940).
42. 313 U.S. 289 (1941).
43. United States v. Royal Indem. Co., 116 F2d 247 (2d Cir. 1940).
44. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
45. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
46. See generally Mishkdn, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Di-
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to all uses is the -fact that the federal court is not bound to apply the state
rule. The considerations which lead a federal court to this decision will vary
according to 'the nature of the case before it. For example, the reasons for
which a court does not follow state law in a suit between states are not the
same reasons which lead it to reject state law when admiralty jurisdiction is
involved.47 Thus there can be no single formula which will govern the choice
of decisional rules in every case. Moreover, the fact that federal law is chosen
for different reasons in each case -will affect the courts formulation of a sub-
stantive "federal" rule. There is no complete and interchangeable body of
"federal law" which can be inserted mechanically into the place of the rejected
state rule. The federal court may look to the body of federal common law
developed under Swift,48 to the law of other states,4 9 to principles of inter-
national law,50 or to policies expressed by Congress ;r1 sometimes the courts
decide that the state law in question is the best rule even though the federal
court is not bound -to accept it.52 The different contexts in which "federal
law" has been used reveal the many different functions described by that term.
One type of "federal law" is the decisional rules used to resolve disputes
between two states. Clearly the federal judge cannot be bound by the rules
which one of the rival claimants -has established, so that a "federal law" of
interstate controversies has evolved. The substance of this "federal law,"
consistent -with its origins, has reflected principles of international law and
a policy of arbitration by a neutral third party.r3 Such law is also expounded
and applied in suits between private parties. Thus in Hinderlider v. La Plata
River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,5 4 the Supreme Court reviewed a state court
decision on interstate division of water rights because the suit involved a
question of "federal common law." Where private parties claim under con-
flicting grants from different states, the same considerations indicate that state
law should not govern the controversy 5
cretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L Rmv. 797
(1957); Note, 53 CoLuMza. L. RE%. 991, 1002-06 (1953).
47. Compare text accompanying notes 53-55 infra, with text accompanying notes
61-62 infra.
48. E.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), discussed in
text accompanying notes 83-91 infra.
49. E.g., Darlington, Inc. v. FHA, 142 F. Supp. 341 (E.D.S.C. 1956), rcu'd on other
gronds, 352 U.S. 977 (1957).
50. E.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902). In addition, the court may look
to principles of English common law. Moore v. United States, 91 U.S. 270, 273 (1876).
51. E.g., D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942), discussed in text
accompanying note 44 mipra.
52. E.g., Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289 (1941), discussed in text
accompanying notes 42-43 supra.
53. See cases cited note 24 mtpra.
54. 304 U.S. 92(1938).
55. See Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp., v. Washington Airport, Inc., 283 U.S. 348(1931); Mfoore v. McGuire, 205 US. 214 (1907); St. Louis v. Rutz, 138 U.S. 226
(1891) ; Coffee v. Groover, 123 U.S. 1 (1887) ; Howard v. Ingersoll, 54 U.S. (13 How.)
1960] 1435
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Another type of "federal law" is that applied in cases involving the sovereign
relations of the United States with other nations. From the drafting of the
Constitution, authorities have accepted the view that in this area state law
has no relevance.56 The Framers felt that in dealings with foreign nations,
there must be one uniform -law, and that an individual state could not be
allowed to embarrass or jeopardize the international relations of the United
States. 57 Thus the interpretation of a treaty depends on "federal law,"5 5  In
cases involving ambassadors, consuls, and foreign ministers, the status of the
officer or the capacity in which he acted presents a federal question, which
if decided in his favor bars an action against him for any state or federal
claim.59
Admiralty and bankruptcy courts also formulate "federal law." From the
grant to Congress of the power to establish uniform rules of bankruptcy, the
courts have implied a duty to fill in the interstices of uniform legislation with
uniform judge-made law drawn from the policies of the Bankruptcy Act."°
The constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction 'has been held 'to imply both
congressional and judicial power to establish rules of federal substantive law in
this area.61 The Supreme Court has described the principles used under the
Jones Act as "a seasoned body of maritime law developed by the experience
of American courts long accustomed to dealing with admiralty in reconciling
our own with foreign interests and in accommodating the reach of our own
laws to those of other maritime nations." 62
"Federal law" also governs the interpretation and application of the federal
constitution and statutes. Just as a state court's construction of its own con-
stitution and statutes is binding upon federal tribunals,63 so the federal courts
are the final judicial authority on the meaning of the federal constitution and
statutes. 64 Here the proper -role of the courts is the interpretation and ini
plementation of national legislative directions, and state law often has no rele-
380 (1851) ; Poole v. Lessee of Fleeger, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 185 (1837) ; Handly's Lesse e,
v. Anthony, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 374 (1820).
56. See HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL CoURTs AND THE FEDERAL SySTEM 21
(1953).
57. See Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTE"%i.
PROD. 3, 13-14 (1948).
58. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) ; Jackson v. Harris, 43 F.2d 513 (10th Cir.1930),
59. See note 22 supra.
60. See Wragg v. Federal Land Bank, 317 U.S. 325 (1943) ; Chicago Bd. of Trade
v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1 (1924). Despite the fact that bankruptcy is outside the diversity
jurisdiction specifically dealt with in Erie, state law may be applicable in sonic cuaeq.
See Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARV. L. Rxv. 1013 (1953).
61. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360-61 (1959)
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
62. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 577 (1953).
63. Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of R.R. Conrm'rs, 332 U.S. 495 (1947):
AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946).
64. Prudence Realization Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89 (1942) ; In re Pittsburgh Ry,.
Co,. 155 F.2d 477 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 731 (1946).
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vance at all.65 Horeover, where the federal statute contains no explicit pro-
vision on a given point, it may nevertheless establish such a clear federal
policy that state law will be ignored. 6 On the other hand, Congress may by
express declaration, 67 or implicitly by silence, 8 allow state law to govern
interstitial matters in areas of federal statutory regulation.
In two areas, however, courts have created a large body of "federal law"
to* replace state rules of decision without adequately discussing the consider-*
ations which have led them to disregard state law. The first of these concerr.
cases in which a federal statute is involved, but in which a particular issue i6
not governed by explicit statutory provision or by clearly defined policies
of the act.609 The second involves suits to which the United States is a party.
In the first category of cases, the concept of the proper scope of federal de-
cisional rules has gradually expanded. At one time only direct conflict with
specific provisions or policies of the statute was held to negative the effect of
state law.7" Later, however, the courts began to derive from federal acts as a
65. Here we are concerned only with the meaning and application of a statute
enacted by Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power under the Constitution,
to tax income. The exertion of that power is not subject to state control. It is
the will of Congress which controls.... State law may control only when the
federal taxing act, by express language or necessary implication, makes its uwn
operation dependent upon state law.
Burriet v. Harmel, 27 U.S. 103, 110 (1932).
66. [I]n areas where Congress has legislated extensively so as to establish a
general policy, that policy may furnish the answer to a particular question, even
though the federal statutes do not e.\-pressly answer it, and though a state statute
expressly enacts an contrary rule.
Fahs v. Martin, 224 F.2d 387, 392 (5th Cir. 1955); see MacGregor v. Westinghouse
Elec. & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402 (1947); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elecm Co., 317 U.S.
173 (1942).
67. The Tort Claims Act, for example, specifically makes state law applicable to
determine the government's liability. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958).
68. See, e.g., Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 152 (1944); Seaboard
Air Line Ry. v. Kenney, 240 U.S. 489 (1916).
69. The issue may involve the meaning of a word in the federal statute, see, Cog., De
Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956), a matter of procedure not provided for in tlt:
act, see, e.g., Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, supra note 21. or
the viability of state law occupying the same area, see, e.g., Sherlock v. Ailing, 93 U.S.
99 (1876). Confronted with such incompletions, the court may reason that state law
applies.
But, failing a complete solution in the federal statutes (and the penumbral area
where Congress has so "filled the field" that state law can have no applicat'on)
we may then properly look to the foundation of legal interests and relationships
created only by state law, to which the federal statutes must be related either
because by their terms th6y postulate such interests and relationships, or because
constitutional limitations of federal power require this.
Fahs v. Martin, 224 F.2d 387, 392 (5th Cir. 1955); see Hill, State Procedural Laze
in Federal Nond,*versity Litigation, 69 HARv. L. REv. 66 (1955).
70. See notes 29-31 .rupra and accompanying text.
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whole a policy necessitating the use of federal rather than state law to resolve
interstitial matters. Thus, the Supreme Court decided in New York Cent.
R.R. v. Winfield 71 that the Federal Employers Liability Act provided the
sole basis of recovery for those classes of employees within its coverage. Uric
v. Thompson 72 held that the meaning of "negligence" in the same act was to
be determined by federal law, although the act itself nowhere defined the word.
'The recent high-water mark in this development is Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills.73 The Supreme Court -there -held that a statute expressly
purporting to give federal courts jurisdiction over suits by or against labor
unions for breach of collective bargaining agreements required the courts to
formulate an entire body of substantive federal law in the field. As federal
courts have come -to rely upon increasingly less explicit legislative policies
against using state law,74 the specific reasons for rejecting state law have tended
to become both obscure and unrelated to the issue in dispute.
An example of this lack of clarity is the frequent appeal to uniformity as a
reason for rejecting state decisional ,rules. Adoption of a uniform federal
rule may be desirable because -it achieves equality of rights and duties for both
the Government and its citizens; or, it may be desirable only because govern-
mental administration is simplified. These considerations are seldom distin-
guished.75 Other courts seem to use "uniformity" simply to escape state law
without considering whether they are in fact achieving uniformity. For ex-
ample, in O'Leary v. Social Security Bd.,70 the court refused to apply state
law, which apparently regarded cemeteries as distinct from religious corpor-
ations, in determining whether an employee of a Roman Catholic burial ground
was within the Social Security Act's exclusion of religious institution employees,
Instead, the court took judicial notice of Roman Catholic doctrine, which
deemed cemeteries exclusively religious in purpose. The court stated that
the act's "sweep is not to be interrupted 'by the variations and idiosyncrasies
in local law."77 The substitution of religious law for state law would involve
71. 244 U.S. 147 (1917).
72. 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
73. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
74. Frequently the state law is rejected even though it parallels federal law. See,
e.g., Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 ('1957); Pennsylvania v. Nelson,
350 U.S. 497 (1956). Compare Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
75. See United States v. Independent School Dist., 209 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1954),
in which the United States was allowed to recover overpayments under the federal
school lunch program. The court did not distinguish between two questions, whether
Oklahoma law applied to immunize a branch of the state government from suit, and
whether certain procedural requirements under Oklahoma law applied to the United
States. The former question permanently affects the rights of the United States, while
the latter relates only to procedures required of the United States in the suits it brings.
For further discussion of "uniformity" as a reason for rejecting state law, see text
accompanying notes 134-39 infra.
76. 153 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1946).
77. Id. at 707.
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diverse treatment for employees of different religious groups, and probably be
much harder to administer uniformly since the doctrines of other faiths are
not as readily ascertainable. 78 Yet neither of these factors was considered in
rejecting state law.
A similar trend from state to federal law is evident in suits to which the
United States is a party.79 Originally it was not thought that the presence
of the United States, by itself, authorized the use of federal law. In United
States v. Gurney,80 decided in 1808, where the Government brought suit on an
instrument, the Court followed the common law of Pennsylvania with which
it said both parties were familiar when they entered into the transaction.
Although disputing what Pennsylvania law was, neither party suggested that
a different law should be applied. In Cox v. United States,8 1 and Duncan v.
United States,8 2 in 1832 and 1833, the Government brought suit in the Louisi-
ana Federal Circuit Court on surety bonds issued in Louisiana covering federal
officials there. Under the state's civil law rule there was a good defense,
although under common law the plaintiff would prevail. The Supreme Court
found -the civil law rule inapplicable, not because the United States was a
party, but on the theory that contracts entered into with the sovereign are to
be performed at the seat of government. Thus the common law in force in
the District of Columbia would govern. Recently, however, the cases of Clear-
field Trust Co. v. United States83 and Uvited States v. Standard Oil Co.8&
have implied that the presence of the United States as a party frees the courts
from any duty to apply state law.8 5
78. Democracy breeds difference of opinion and among Baptists the widest %ariety
of opinion is to be found. Each individual Baptist congregation is its own final
court of appeal, and any individual dissident member-if he can find like-minded
persons to join him--may withdraw and form a new Baptist church. Consequently
it is possible to identify only dominent traits and characteristics.
3 ENcYCLOPEDIA A-SERICANA 220 (1956).
79. The two classes of cases are not entirely separable, for frequently both the Guvern-
ment as a party and an enabling statute are involved. See, e.g., United States v. McCabe
Co., 261 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1958), in which the court first held that the Commodity
Credit Corporation was an instrumentality of the United States, giving rise to the issue
of whether a law of North Dakota could wipe out a cause of action in favor of the United
States. Id. at 543. The court then examined the federal statute involved to determine the
question. Id. at 545. This left it unclear how far the status of the CCC, and how far the
statute, was determinative.
80. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch.) 333 (1808). See United States v. Morrison, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.)
123 (1830); United States v. Wardwell, 28 Fed. Cas. (No. 16640) (C.C.D.R.1. 1828).
81. 31 U.S. (6 Pet) 172 (1832).
82. 32 U.S. (7 Pet) 435 (1833).
83. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
84. 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
85. For discussion of this interpretation of Clearfield and Standard Oil, see Gorrell &
Weed, Erie Railroad: Ten Years After, 9 Omo ST. L.J. 276, 291-92 (1943); Pofcher,
The Choice of Law, State or Federal, in Cases Involdng Government Contracts, 12 LA.
L. Rxv. 37, 47 (1951); Reifenberg, Comninon Li.t-Federal, 30 ORE. L. Rzv. 164, 172
(1951).
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In Clearfield, a WPA paycheck drawn on the Treasury of the United States
was intercepted in -the mails, forged, and cashed at a local store. The check
was endorsed over to the Clearfield Trust Co., which in turn endorsed it over to
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, collected the amount of the check
and paid to the store. The employee eventually executed an affidavit of forgery
and got his salary.86 More than six months after the forgery, the United States
brought suit to recover from the Clearfield Trust Company; the defendant
contended that the delay of the United States in bringing suit barred its re-
covery.8 7 Under the law of Pennsylvania, applied by the District Court,88 the
defense prevailed. The Court of Appeals reversed 8 ) and was affirmed by the
Supreme Court on the ground that "federal law" should govern and that under
the pre-Erie federal common law delay is a defense only where it causes manifest
damage to the acceptor of the forged signature. 0 The Supreme Court found
federal law applicable on two grounds: the disbursement of funds by the federal
government is an exercise of a constitutional power, so that all rights and duties
thereby created "find their roots in the same federal source"; therefore, federal
courts must fashion their own law in the absence of a governing federal statute.
Second, the variety of state law, if applied, "would subject the rights and duties
of the United States to exceptional uncertainty."01
United States v. Standard Oil Co. involved an attempt by the federal govern-
ment to recover for a tort not recognized 'by state law. A soldier was injured
in California by a Standard Oil truck and settled with the company, but the
United States sued for reimbursement of the soldier's medical expenses and
his salary while hospitalized. 92 To allow such a recovery, the Court would have
had to recognize a new cause of action in tort, analogous to one for interference
with a master-servant or famiily relationship. The Government argued that
the applicable law was federal common law, not the common law of California
which did not recognize such torts.93 The Court agreed, reasoning that the mili-
tary relationship was a creature of federal law and that every interference with
that relationship should be governed by federal law. 94 The need for uniformity
of the Government's rights and obligations was also stressed. 95 The Court's
opinion interpreted Clearfield to require that state rules of decision be rejected
whenever property rights of the United States are litigated,9 except where "the
86. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, supra note 83, at 364-66.
87. Id. at 366.
88. The unreported opinion of the District Court for the Western District of Penn-
sylvania may be found in Record, p. 13, Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S.
363 (1943).
89. United States v. Clearfield Trust Co., 130 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1942).
90. 318 U.S. at 367, 370.
91. Id. at 367.
92. 332 U.S. 301, 302 (1947).
93. Id. at 305.
94. Id. at 305-06.
95. Id. at 307.
96. Id. at 306.
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Government has simply substituted itself for others as successor to rights gov-
erned by state law."97
After the decision has been made to apply federal rather than state law in a
given case, the process of decision is further obscured by the failure of court-s
to specify the sources upon which they draw in formulating the new federal
rule.98 Federal judge-made law in the traditional common-law fields may bc
divided into two categories. In one the court follows what it deems a sound
general principle of the common law.99 For e.x-ample, in United Statcs vi. Sabin
Metal Corp., 00 the court applied the general contract law dealing with uni-
lateral mistakes in executory contracts, as set forth in Williston, The Restate-
ment, and Corpus Juris Secundiam. In the second category of cases, the federal
court avowedly seeks the rule best designed to implement a federal policy ur
statute, or to protect the interest of the federal government,' 0 ' without examina-
tion of or regard for common-law sources. In both D'Ocnch, Duhdm & Co.
v. FDIC 0 2 and Dietrick v. Greaney,'03 for example, the Court stated that since
federal law controlled the implementation of a federal statute, inquiry into the
effect of state law was unnecessary. In spite of the fact that the two categories
of federal judge-made law are quite distinct in purpose, the courts frequently
write their opinions and cite their authorities without indicating whether the
rule is governed by general common-law principles or dictated by particular
federal interests. 0 4
97. Id. at 309. The court found, however, that even the federal common law did not
comprehend the new cause of action, and that Congress, not the courts, w%as the proper
body to authorize the award of damages for new types of injuries. The issue concerned
the fiscal policy of the United States and the determination of that policy was constitutionally
within the exclusive power of Congress. Id. at 314-17. As in Ciearfield, congres.ional
silence was not taken to mean that state law should control, but rather that courts should
look to the general federal common law.
98. Courts sometimes still talk as though they were finding law, not making it. Sbm.
e.g., Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 US. 111, 113 n.1 (1938); Whitin Mach.
Works v. United States, 175 F.2d 504, 507 (1st Cir. 1949) ; cf. West v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236-37 (1940). Compare Parker, Erie v. Tompkins in Retrospect-
An Analysis of Its Proper Area and Limits, 35 A.B.A.J. 19, 83-84 (1949). At other times
courts face the issue squarely: "And so the concrete problem is to determine the naterials
out of which the judicial rule ... should be formulated." Board of Comm'rs v. United
States, 308 U.S. 343, 350 (1939).
99. See, e.g., Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947); United State.,
v. Standard Rice'Co., 323 U.S. 106 (1944); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315
U.S. 289 (1942).
100. 151 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Federal courts looking to the common law
sometimes reject the established rule in favor of one better reasoned or more cinsistent
with modern views. See, e.g., Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
101. See Note, 53 CoLum. L. REv. 991, 1002 (1953) ; cf. Comment, 40 Com.mu. LQ.
561, 569 (1955) (maintaining that without specific congressional direction the courts should
not give the United States any special protection).
102. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
103. 309 U.S. 190 (1940).
104. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, mspra note 83, in which the Court
speaks as though it were formulating the general rule, while its actual concern was prob-
ably to protect the fiscal interests of the United States.
i1w]o 1441
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
When federal courts decide to apply state rules of decision, they are equally
reticent in articulating the standards which govern their choice. Often it is
not clear whether the court must apply state law, or whether it merely chooses
the state rule as an acceptable statement of federal law.' 05 Whether mandatory
or discretionary, the basis of .the court's choice is often masked in conclusionary
language. They may say ,that it is "proper" to follow the state rule, 00 or
that its utilization would avoid confusion.10 7 They may assert that the state
rule, while not "controlling," seems "suitable."' 08 Or they may banish queries
as to the propriety of choosing state law by remarking that the federal rule
on ,the point would be no different. 00 Such reasons as these offer little guide
to future courts or litigants confronted with a variant situation.
A METHODOLOGY FOR RULES OF DECISION PROBLEMS
Two separate problems face the federal court in search of the correct rule
of decision. First, the court must decide whether the Rules of Decision Act
permits it to disregard state law. If it does, the court then must formulate
the federal rule.
The United States as a Party
The Clearfield-Standard Oil doctrine, rejecting state law in almost all suits
to which the United States is a party, seems contrary to historical evidence.
The records and debates on the adoption of the Constitution give no indication
that the United States would be subject to a body of law different from
that applied to other litigants. The only reason advanced for granting
federal jurisdiction over suits involving the United States was the propriety
of allowing the sovereign access to its own tribunals.110 Moreover, an ex-
105. See cases cited note 7 supra.
106. United States ex rel. Hargis v. Maryland Cas. Co., 64 F. Supp. 522, 527 (S.D.
Cal. 1946).
107. RFC v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 210 (1946).
108. Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289, 297 (1941).
109. Whitin Mach. Works v. United States, 175 F2d 504, 507 (1st Cir. 1949);
United States v. Kansas City, 159 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1946).
110. See 2 ELIOT 490; 3 id. at 532. See also TuE FEDERALsr No. 80, at 588 (Hamilton
ed. 1880) (Hamilton). It was pointed out that the United States still could resort to
state courts. 2 ELLIOT 491. Fear was expressed that the grant of federal jurisdiction
might become oppressive. 3 id. at 523.
A logical argument has also been made for the proposition that Section 34 applies
to suits to which the United States is a party. The Constitution grants the federal courts
jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution, statutes, or treaties of the Unitd
States, and also over cases to which the United States is a party. Thus, these would
seem to comprise two separate types of cases. The exception of Section 34---"except
where the constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States ... otherwise require..."
-refers only to the former. Cf. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S.
354 (1959) (same reasoning applied in admiralty action).
Also, more simply, if section 34 was not intended to apply to cases involving the United




amination of the early cases reveals that more was required to displace state
decisional rules than the fact that the United States was a party. The only
two pre-Swift cases cited by the Government in its brief in Clearfield " to
establish the principle that the United States is not to be bound by state law
were Cox v. United States and Duncan v,. United States, both decided upon
the theory that the contracts involved were to be performed at the seat of
government' 1 2 If the ,Court had believed that the United States was exempt
from state law, such reasoning would have been unnecessary. In view of the
long-standing policy of applying state rules of decision to such cases,"' the
application of "federal law" should receive more careful consideration than
it has under -the cases following Clearfield.
State law is probably inapposite in cases where the interest of the Govern-
ment as a litigant involves execution of policy-maling functions, such as ex-
ercise of the foreign relations power. But since any interest of the Government
is ultimately rooted in the exercise of one of its powers, application of federal
law whenever litigation affects the exercise of a governmental power would conic
full circle to applying federal law in every case." 4 The concern for state rules
of decision expressed in the Rules of Decision Act may support a distinction
between active policy-making functions and less important housekeeping func-
tions such as protection of property or payroll disbursement." 5 While appli-
111. Brief for the United States, p. 11, Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318
U.S. 363 (1943).
112. See notes 81-82 supra and accompanying text.
113. Admittedly, the early cases do not always say precisely that state law is being
applied. In at least one case the Supreme Court dearly applied state law to a suit
involving the United States. United States v. Gurney, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 333 (1803).
The tenor of other opinions suggests that the court was applying the same principles to
the United States as it would to any other party. See, e.g., United States v. Barker, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 559 (1827) ; United States v. Wilkins, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 135 (1821);
Fenemore v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 357 (1797).
A possible explanation of the imprecision in explaining what law was being used i6
that, in the area of general commercial law, the law of merchants was considered uniform,
and part of the law of each state, unless changed by statute. Compare Street, Is There a
General Commercial Law Administered by the Courts of the United States Irrespective
of the Laws of the Particular State in Which the Court Is Held?, 21 Ast. L REG. 473, 480
(1873).
114. As one judge argued, this rationale would call for application of federal law in
every case involving currency of the United States. Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp. v.
Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 199 F.2d 127, 133 (6th Cir. 1952) (dissenting opinion).
115. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, supra note 83 (disbursement) and United
States v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 84 (loss of soldier's services), discussed supra notes
86-100, seem to involve governmental functions of this nature.
A distinction similar to the one suggested seems to have been employed in Denver &
R.G.R. Co. v. United States, 241 Fed. 614, 618 (1917), applying Colorado statute of limi-
tation to tort claim of the United States.
It is established law that the government is not bound by any statute of limitatiunm
in a suit brought by it as a sovereign to enforce a public right, and the question at
once arises: Is this such a suit? We think not, but rather a suit by it, as a body
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cation of state law to litigation involving the Goverment as housekeeper may
afford less protection to governmental property, it need not frustrate the achieve-
ment of federal policies. For example, in both United States v. Pink Il and
United States v. Curtiss Aeroplane Co.," 7 the United States sued as assignee
of the Russian government, pursuant to the terms of the Litvinov agreement
which had provided in conjunction with recognition of the Soviet Union that
the United States should succeed to Soviet claims in this country. Many of
these claims derived from Soviet nationalization decrees; in Pink, a suit to
recover the balance of the assets of the New York branch of a Russian insurance
company, the validity of such a decree was held to be a matter of federal law
rather than New York conflicts rules. In Curtiss, the decisive issue was whether
an agreement 'between Curtiss and the Provisional Russian Government not
to plead the statute of limitations with respect to a previous contract was con-
trary to public policy. Despite the presence of the United States as a party,
New York policy was held to govern, and the waiver agreement was upheld.
The application of different law in each case might be explained in terms of the
impact of either decision upon the foreign policy of the United States. Faced
with international friction due to the Soviet government's refusal to honor
American claims upon Russian corporations, the federal government had chosen
to recognize the validity of the nationalization decree and to receive assignment
of nationalized assets in America as a compensatory device.118 To allow state
courts to pass upon the validity of nationalization decrees would have jeopar-
dized the entire arrangement. On the other hand, a decision concerning the
ownership of one asset, a contract right, would not have prejudiced the agree-
ment, nor would it have denied validity to a foreign government's action already
affirmed by executive compact.
Interpreting the Rules of Decision Act to allow resort to federal law only
when a major federal policy is at stake may 'be justified by other considerations.
When the Government comes into contact with private individuals in the ex-
ercise of its routine functions, the individual often may expect that state law
will govern his rights and duties. The dearest case is the collection of debts
owed the federal government. In satisfying its claim against one debtor, the
Government may succeed to the debtor's rights against third parties who had
politic or artificial person ... to enforce a civil right. ... As an owner of property
it has the same right to have it protected by local laws that other persons have....
Its rights and remedies in relation to its property are usually such as apply to other
landowners within the state . . . and it is to be treated like other persons owning
lands therein and subject to local laws.
Compare United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 50 F. Supp. 73 (M.D. Pa. 1943)
(U.S. Savings Bonds; governed by Treasury regulation), with In re Smulyan, 98 F. Supp.
618 (M.D. Pa. 1951) (same; state law applied in absence of Treasury Regulations). See
also United States v. Harpootlian, 24 F2d 646 (2d Cir. 1928).
116. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
117. 147 F2d 639 (2d Cir. 1945).
118. United States v. Pink, supra note 116, at 224-25. See generally United States
v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 326-27, 330 (1937).
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no contemplation of dealing with the federal government. Case law has some-
times recognized the inequity of applying federal law to such transactions; for
example, dicta in United States v. Standard Oil Co. indicates that federal law
will not apply when the Government sues as the assignee of a private claim.""
On the other hand, the expectations of private parties seems to have been ig-
nored in holding that claims made by the United States against decedents'
estates are not subject to "nonclaim" statutes which bar all claims not filed
within a specified period. Administrators have been held personally liable,' - ,
even though they may have had no way of knowing that a negotiable obliga-
tion has passed into the Government's hands. And in the case of a tort
causing damage -to United States property, the Standard Oil rationale that
federal property must be protected by federal law 121 seems to ignore the fact
that persons driving on a public highway do not expect that different rules
of conduct or liabilities will ensue in the presence of Government vehicles or
personnel.
The significance of the "expectation" factor follows from a consideration of
the function of law in society. Law serves as far more than a set of rules for
settling litigation; it establishes the rules by which men govern their affairs.Y
In a sense, litigation marks the failure of the system. 13 Since the law stake-
out the boundaries of permissible conduct, the more certain it is, the more
efficiently society should 'be able to function. 12 4 To the extent that a court'.S
choice of applicable rules of decision contradicts the expectation of the party
involved, the law becomes less certain and less able to serve as a guide to
conduct.
Although persons engaged in direct commercial dealings with the United
States are put on notice that special rules of conduct may be applicable,12
use of state decisional rules may nevertheless be warranted by the fact that the
ultimate responsibility for failures to perform are often determined by state
law. A government contractor's nonperformance may have been caused by
119. 332 U.S. 301, 308-09 (1947) ; see United States v. Hansett, 120 F2d 121 (2d Cir.
1941); United States v. Schumacher, 154 F. Supp. 425 (F.D. Wis. 1957).
120. See United States v. Gibson, 101 F. Supp. 225 (D. Idaho 1951) (adminitstratur
may be personally liable to United States on claim not presented by United States vAthin
period of nonclaim statute); United States v. Deimer, 140 F. Supp. 88 (D. Wyo. 1953
(lack of notice prior to running of nonclaim statute no bar to United States claim).
121. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
122. See HaRT & WEcHsLEn, TnE Famn .L Couars APw Tim Fnnsna. Svsu-. 634
(1953).
123. Cf. HART & SACKs, THE LEGAL PRocnss: BAsIc PnoBLmxs IN THE MAXING AND
APPLICATIoN OF LAW 185 (Temp. ed. 1958) (mimeographed).
124. Cf. 1 BEALE, CoNricr OF LAws 4748 (1935) ; Carter, Law: Its Origin, Growth,
and Funvction, in READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE 117 (Hall ed. 1938).
125. State law does not control the rights of parties under a lease executed by the
United States, Girard Trust Co. v. United States, 149 F2d 872 (3rd Cir. 1945), or under
contracts of employment between federal corporations and individuals, United States %.
Goodin, 66 F. Supp. 214 (D. Neb. 1946), or under policies of the National life Insurance
Company, Woodward v. United States, 167 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1948), or under c.ntracts
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the conduct of his subcontractors, from whom he will seek recovery. If differ-
ent rules of decision are applied in the two actions ' 2 0-for example, if the
subcontractor can assert a state law defense not open to the general contractor
under federal law-the responsibility for losses may be inequitably placed. A
similar problem would arise when -the government sues a prior holder of a
negotiable instrument, 127 or one of several joint tortfeasors. Absent statutory
provisions requiring federal law to be applied in the Government's action, use
of state law in the first instance seems more likely to effect an equitable solution
to the controversy.
Cases Involving Interpretation of a Federal Statute
Choosing the correct rule of decision to be applied in cases involving a federal
statute presents somewhat different considerations. State rules of decision
might be applied in any of three ways: (1) a term of the act may require
further definition; (2) no provision may be made for certain matters, such as
a statute of limitations or survival of actions: (3) the statute may regulate cer-
tain areas without indicating whether existing state law in that area is pre-
empted or continues in force where the federal law does not specifically
govern. 28 In the absence of evidence of congressional intent to the contrary,
state law would seem applicable under the Rules of Decision Act in all three
cases, for the statute does not "otherwise require or provide." Of course,
courts examining the major purposes of the act may find that the application
of state law will cause results contrary to the objectives sought by Congress." t'
In some cases, the lack of uniformity itself may obstruct the operation of a
statute even though none of the various results are by themselves objection-
able. 130 But this is, in effect, simply a finding of congressional intent not to
be bound by state law. Without that finding, state law should be followed.
of sale with the government, United States v. Sabin Metal Corp., 151 F. Supp. 683
(S.D.N.Y. 1957).
On the other hand, rights of subcontractors who do not deal directly with the govern-
ment have been governed by state law. See Blair v. United States c.v rel. Gregory-Hogan,
147 F.2d 840 (8th Cir.), modified for other reasons, 150 F2d 676 (8th Cir. .1945) ; United
States ex rel Gillioz v. John Kerns Constr. Co., 50 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Ark. 1943), rev'd
on other grounds, 140 F.2d 792 (8th Cir. 1944) ; United States ex rel. Wilkinson v. Lange,
35 F. Supp. 17 (D. Md. 1940), af'd, 120 F.2d 886 (4th Cir. 1941).
126. Under the Miller Act, 49 Stat. 7,93 (1935), 40 U.S.C. §§ 270(a)-(d) (1958),
actions between the United States and prime contractors have been held to be governed by
federal law. R. P. Farnsworth & Co. v. Electrical Supply Co., 112 F2d 150 (5th Cir.
1940). Suits by the contractor against his subcontractor, however, seem to follow
principles of state law. See note 125 supra.
127. See Fulton Nat'l Bank v. United States, 197 F.2d 763 (5th Cr. 1952) (dissenting
opinion, Rives, J.), a situation much like Clearfield. But here it seems that the defendant
was barred by state law from recovery against prior endorsers.
128. See note 69 supra.
129. See, e.g., notes 67-68 supra and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., T. & M. Transp. Co. v. S. W. Shattuck Chem. Co., 158 F.2d 909 (10th
Cir. 1947) (semble) ; Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Kearney Trust Co., 151 F.2d
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One of the attitudes leading to the rejection of state law in this area seens
to be a presumnption that -Congress must have intended all issues arising in
the construction of a federal statute to be governed by federal law. In Schwa-
bacher v. United States,13 ' where dissident shareholders opposed a railroad
merger because the plan allegedly violated their charter rights under state
law, -the Supreme Court -held that charter rights of such stockholders were
within the purview of the Transportation Act of 1940 even though the act it-
self did not mention the problem. The Court then considered whether, in
determining charter rights, the ICC should look to state law or should fashion
its rules from the act's general criteria. The majority reasoned that federal
law must apply because "the Commission likely would not and probably could
not .be given plenary and exclusive jurisdiction to interpret and apply any
state's law.' 31 z2 While the Court also supported its decision by finding that
state law was inconsistent with the policies of the Transportation Act, the first
reason given would completely preclude the use of state law for filling in the
interstices of federal legislation.' 33 Wholesale rejection of state law, when
the federal act does not so require, seems inconsistent with the policy ex-
pressed in the Rules of Decision Act.
When federal law is chosen for the purpose of uniformity, several distinct
considerations under the heading of "uniformity" are seldom distinguished.
If the application of a different rule in every state will produce different rights
and duties under the act, uniformity becomes a powerful argument.1 4 Even
here, however, the federal government may have intended to create a certain
interest and to allow states to administer that interest according to local policies.
In a statute providing for renewal of copyrights, for example, Congress pro-
vided that the right to renew should pass to the widow and children and then to
executors and heirs of the original holder, apparently contemplating that each
state should distribute the interest according to its own laws of descent and
distribution.135 In some circumstances, moreover, the variety of state law.,
720, 725 (8th Cir. 1945); Matcovich v. Anglim, 134 F.2d 834 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 744 (1943).
131. 334 U.S. 182 (1948).
132. Id. at 198.
133. Similar results are suggested by the reasoning of Bowles v. Farmers Nat'l Bank.
147 F.2d 425, 430 (6th Cir. 1945), in which the court held that a state survival of acdoun
statute could not apply because the instant action had been created by federal btatute.
See also Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 81 (1940) ; Bishop v. Rosin, 69 F. Supp.
915 (E.D. Mich. 1946).
134. See De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 583 (1956) (concurring opinion,
Douglas, J.); Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289, 297 (1941) (dissenting
opinion, Black, J.).
Even if a general rule of common law is adopted by the federal courts, uniformity may
not immediately obtain. Since circuit courts are not bound by each others deciion.
see 1 fooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE ff 0.402[l] (1959), conflict among the circuits can limit
the benefits of "uniformity!' See, e.g., Note, 69 YALE L.J. 309, 316 & n.44 (1959). And
it.is by no means certain that the Supreme Court will grant review. See Stem, Denial oj
Certiorari Despite a Conflict, 66 HA.v. L. Rrv. 465 (1953).
135. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
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may merely impose a procedural or administrative burden on the federal gov-
ernment without affecting its ability to treat citizens equally. For example,
while state laws dealing with assertion of claims against decedents' estates
may require the Government to adopt different methods of operation in each
state, they do not affect the power to aclieve the same uniform results.13"
Balanced against the state's interest in dealing with such matters uniformly,
the rewards of national uniformity in this case may be of less weight. For
that reason, the actual administrative burden caused by the application of
diverse state laws should be assessed in each case. State laws on the matter
may not in fact differ very widely.' 3 7 Even if they do, it remains to be asked
whether application of the law state-by-state will create the anticipated con-
fusion. For example, in Otis & Co. v. SEC,13 charter provisions tinder state
law providing for specified preferences upon liquidation were held inoperative
in a simplification by liquidation under the Public Utility Holding Company
Act. Here the SEC's power to formulate "fair and equitable" plans for liquida-
tion would be hampered by enforced compliance with all the varying state
laws. But the effect of variation may be neutralized by customarily handling
the matter at the local level through officials familiar with state law, as is
the case with the Veterans Administration.'s d In this case, no major ad-
ministrative problems are presented by the use of state law.
When the Rules of Decision Act compels acceptance of state decisional
law due to the absence of any conflict 'with the federal statute, the court's de-
cision cannot be made with the same certainty that obtains when Congress
specifically adopts the state rule of decision. In the former situation, the court
must provide for circumstances in which an unforeseen state rule of decision
will produce a result contrary to one of the purposes of the statute. Thus, in
interpreting the federal statute allowing the renewal of a copyright by the
children of the copyright 'holder, the Supreme Court held that state rules
of decision would define the term "children," except where the state law was
abnormal.140
136. It is generally held that the United States is not bound by state nonclaim statutes.
See United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940); United States v. Deinier, 140
F. Supp. 88 (D. Wyo. 1953); United States v. Anderson, 66 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn.
1946). If such statutes were held applicable, the United States would not be deprived
of a right, but would merely be forced to bring its actions more within the time allowed
by each state. In many jurisdictions where the state itself cannot recover a claim brought
beyond the period of the nonclain statute, see Hill v. State, 23 Ark. 604 (1861) ; In re
Peers' Estate, 234 Iowa 403, 12 N.W.2d 894 (1944); Donnally v. Montgomery County
Welfare Bd., 200 Md. 534, 92 A.2d 354 (1952); State v. Evans, 143 Wash. 449, 255 Pac.
1035 (1927), the United States seems entitled to no greater consideration.
137. See Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson, 47 YALE L.J. 1336, 1349 (1938).
138. 323 U.S. 624 (1945).
139. See Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion
in the Choice of National and State Rides for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. Rzv. 797, 818-19
(1957).
140. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 581 (1956); accord, Nebraska v. United
States, 164 F.2d 866, 868 (8th Cir. 1947) (unusual property concept held an exception
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Courts sometimes assert that they are not bound to apply state law by the
Rules of Decision Act, but nevertheless choose to apply the law of each state
as a matter of discretion. The Supreme Court has held, for example, that
interest rates due on defaulted contracts with. the Government must be a matter
of federal law, but that the rate in force in the state where the contract was
executed and performed would be incorporated as the federal rule, because
no federal statute or policy would be offended by the use of individual state
rules.141 Similarly, state interest rates have been applied in federal condem-
nation proceedings as a matter of discretion when the relevant federal statute
was construed to give federal courts power to formulate their own rule.1 4-'
Phrasing the result in terms of discretion rather than compulsion does not
change the substantive rule applicable in the particular case. Moreover, the
reasons for choosing state law seem to be the same-in both cases, decisions
rely on the absence of a conflicting federal policy. The major significance of
the "discretion" terminology seems to be an assertion by the court that it will
remain free to examine each state law that comes before it and to reject any
which it finds incompatible with some federal policy.143 Since a decision to
apply state law under the Rules of Decision Act, other than that following
clear congressional directive to apply state law, must be qualified in the same
way, arguably the distinction between mandatory and discretionary applica-
tion of state law is nonexistent in this context. The Rules of Decision Act
cannot result in rigid, mandatory rules any more than the court's discretion
is really freed by the absence of specific congressional policy on a given issue.
Since the process of defining the unarticulated objectives of federal legis-
lation is admittedly imprecise and often a matter of guesswork, 144 a court
choosing rules of decision in this area should also give weight to some of the
subsidiary considerations previously mentioned. For example, the court could
consider whether the statute deals with areas of commercial relations in which
private parties may reasonably have expected state lawv to govern, and whether
imposition of a federal rule may not subject different parts of the same trans-
action to different laws. The court may consider also the impact of a federal
rule of decision upon related state policies and governmental operations. Courts
have occasionally supported the choice to apply state law by mentioning these
factors under the heading: "Congress must have intended." Thus, in RFC v,.
Beaver County, the meaning of "real property" in the Reconstruction Finance
to general rule that state law governs real property rights) ; Puhfahl v. Estate of Parks,
299 U.S. 217 (1936) (court will consider whether state law discriminates against the
federal government).
141. Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289, 297 (1941).
142. Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78, 87 (1923); see Seaboard Airline Ry.
v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 306 (1923).
143. See Mishkin, supra note 139, at 804-05.
144. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 452, 455 (1957) ; id.
at 462 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ; Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 288 (1933) :
Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln .1!ills
Case, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1, 14-17 (1958).
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Corporation Act was left to be determined by state law. The act provided
that -the real property of the RFC was to be subject to state and local taxation,
and the Court emphasized the confusion which would result if the local taxing
authorities could not employ their accustomed standards.145 Similar results
should obtain where the state has primary responsibility for the field of law
in question-e.g., real property,1 40 family relations, 147 or estates 148 -while
areas of exclusively federal interest such as income taxation 140 or foreign re-
lations 10 will be best served by a federal rule.
Formulating A Federal Rule
When it is determined in a given instance that state decisional rules are not
binding, -the federal court remains faced with the problem of formulating
a substantive federal rule. While there may be a federal common-law doctrine
which would furnish a convenient rule, the process of choosing a federal rule of
decision requires more than the mere replacement of one rule with another ready
made. If the federal rule is to satisfy the objection made to state rules of decision.
its formulation must be governed by those same considerations which counseled
rejection of the state law.'' Thus the federal law applied to Soviet national-
ization decrees under the Litvinov agreement must look to that agreement
and seek to effectuate it.'0 2 Similarly, if state law is rejected because it lacks
uniformity, the court should not adopt equally varied church laws in its place.""'
Some courts have been influenced in their choice of decisional rules by the
alternative sources of law available. For example, if the issue before the court
deals with family law, the court may feel bound to look to state law because
there is no federal common law of domestic relations. 1 4 Reluctance to create
145. 328 U.S. 204, 210 (1946); see Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144
(1944) (definition of "public utility"). But see Board of Comm'rs v. United Stateq, 303-
U.S. 343 (1939), discussed in text accompanying note 40 supra.
146. See Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. Martin, 268 U.S. 458, 462 (1925) ; Clarke
v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900) ; Lowndes v. Huntington, 153 U.S. 1 (1894) ; Halsted v.
Buster, 140 U.S. 273 (1891).
147. See Ohio ex reL Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379 (1930) ; In re Burrus, 136 U.S.
586 (1890); Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76 (1878); Payne v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d
398 (5th Cir. 1944); Wilson v. Wilson, 128 F. Supp. 88 (D. Mass. 1955); Kowalski v.
Chicago Great W. Ry., 84 Fed. 586 (N.D. Iowa 1898), af'd, 92 Fed. 310 (8th Cir. 1899).
148. See Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938); De Vaughn v. Hutchinson, 165 U.S.
566 (1897); Roberts v. Lewis, 153 U.S. 367 (1894); United States v. Fox, 94 U.S.
315 (1876); Sharpe v. Commissioner, 107 F2d 13 (3d Cir. 1939); Wells v. Brown,
255 Fed. 852 (8th Cir. 1919).
149. See note 65 supra.
150. See, e.g., Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
151. See text accompanying notes 48-68 supra.
152. See text accompanying notes 1,16-18 sepra.
153. See text accompanying notes 76-78 .upra.
154. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-81 (1956) ("there is no federal law
of domestic relations"), 42 A.B.A.J. 762, 31 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 1319. See also RFC v. Beaver
County, 328 U.S. 204, 208-10 (1946) ; Board of Directors v. RFC, 170 F.2d 430, 432 (8th
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wholly new doctrines is a trait common to any court dealing with judge-made
law, and is a valid consideration in this case. An attempt to write new federal
law without antecedents is fraught with uncertainty and potential unfairness. 15
On the other hand, the absence of an existing federal law ought not to assume
so much importance that the court feels compelled to follow state lawim° The
decision to apply federal law does not depend upon the presence of a ready
made federal law; it means only that certain considerations have led the
court not to ,be bound by a state's common law. If no state's law will satisfy
those objections, the court must of necessity fashion a federal law which will.157
When looking to the reasons for which state decisional rules were inapplic-
able, courts should distinguish between reasons of substance and reasons of
form. When only uniformity is sought in a suit to which the United States
is a party, for example, considerations of how best to promote the interest of
the Government seem improper.158 The court's primary concern should be
to discover the rule of state or federal common law which it would find prefer-
able if the controversy involved two private parties, giving weight to the in-
trinsic merits of the rule and its familiarity to the parties affected. The need
for impartial rules in 'this area has sometimes been recognized by courts which
state that the Government, litigating matters arising from its commercial
ventures, must "do business on business terms."15 9
Cir. 1948); Ferguson v. Union Nat'l Bank, 126 F2d 753, 759 (4th Cir. 1942); In re
United Pub. Util. Corp., 52 F. Supp. 975, 976-77 (D. Del. 1943); In re Jacksonville
Gas. Co., 46 F. Supp. 852, 858 (S.D. Fla. 1942).
155. See Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 112-13 (1944) (dissenting
opinion, Roberts, J.) ; Jackson, Deciional Law and Stare Decisis, 30 A.B.A.J. 334 (1944).
156. See note 98 supra.
157. See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs v. United States, supra note 145, at 350.
158. It may be pointed out that in the usual case in which local law is held inapplicable
to a federal suit, it is the United States as plaintiff which profits by the denial of
a defense under local law.... But the principle of the application of federal law
is not in the least affected thereby. What is sauce for the federal plaintiff as
gander ought to be sauce for it when it is goose.
United States v. Matthews, 139 F. Supp. 683, 690 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
[A] government may suffer loss through negligence of its officers. If it comes down
from its position of sovereignty, and enters the domain of commerce, it submits
itself to the same laws that govern individuals there.
Cooke v. United States, 91 US. 389, 398 (1875).
Nevertheless, the courts sometimes seem to manipulate the concepts of state and federal
law to benefit the government. See, e.g., Fulton Nat'l Bank v. United States, 197 F2d
763 (5th Cir. 1952) (Georgia law relied on to establish that endorsements of government
checks were illegal or unauthorized; federal law applied -o obviate Georgia statute barring
recovery on forged endorsements after one year); cf. Rhode Island Discount Co. v. United
States, 118 Ct. Cl. 262, 94 F. Supp. 669 (1951).
159. United States v. National Exchange Bank, 270 U.S. 527, 534 (192-6); accord,
Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389 (1875). But ef. United States v. 'McCabe Co., 261
F.2d 539, 543-44 (8th Cir. 1958), suggesting that a different law applied to the CCC
as a government corporation than would have applied had it remained a Delaware cor-
poration.
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Almost as important as the process of decision itself is the manner in which
such decisions are articulated. Federal law does not replace state law simply
because the United States is a litigant, or because a federal statute is somehow
involved. State law must be found unsuitable for certain specific reasons.
Unless those reasons are made clear, courts in subsequent cases may be misled
into rejecting state law when, despite similarity of issues, the real reasons for
the earlier decision are not present.160 And since the substance of the federal
rule itself will depend upon the reasons for rejecting state law, courts cannot
intelligently create a "federal law" unless such reasons are known and ex-
pressed. When the federal rule is chosen, careful enunciation of the source
from which the rule was drawn 161 is necessary to avoid misapplication of
that precedent in other cases. For example, a clear understanding that the
federal law is based upon some statutory policy rather than common law will
obviate consideration of any common law defenses.'0 2 The need to articulate
all the considerations which influence the choice of decisional rules becomes
manifest when the process of decision is recognized for what it is: the judiciary
is making federal law, not finding it.
160. A recent example of this uncertainty is United States v. McCabe Co., 261 F,2d
539 (8th Cir. 1959), reversing United States v. McDonald Grain & Seed Co., 154 F. Supp,
329 (D.N. Dak. 1957). Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals used the same
passage from RFC v. Breeding, 211 F2d 385 (10th Cir. 1954), to support their holdings
and reached precisely contrary conclusions, 261 F.2d at 543; 154 F. Supp. at 334.
161. See notes 48-52 supra and accompanying text.
162. Thus state law, which apparently would have dictated a contrary result, was not
considered in United States v. View Crest Garden Apartments, Inc., 268 F.2d 380 (9th
Cir. 1959) (action to foreclose FHA mortgage and appoint receiver); United States v.
Starks, 239 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1956) (construing clause of lease of United States military
reservation).
The source of federal law seems to have been misapprehended in Priebe & Sons v.
United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947). The Court applied a common law presumption against
liquidated damage clauses in a suit involving war contracts, although the basis of federal
law seems to have been the necessity of effectuating the emergency war powers of the
federal government.
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